first term of office is drawing to a close. What has become of the promises he made in his economic programme four years ago and what is the outlook for the short and medium term?
O n 18th February 1981, a month after his inauguration, President Ronald Reagan presented Congress with an economic programme consisting of four points: 1 [] Restriction of government spending. During the four years of the Carter Administration (fiscal year s 1977-81) Federal expenditure had increased by 13 % a year, a real rate of 4.2 % compared with 2.5 % real growth in GNP. Real expenditure was now to be frozen at the 1981 level until 1985 and thereby reduced from more than 22 % of GNP to 19.3 %. At the same time, there was to be a marked change in the emphasis of expenditure allocation away from transfer payments and other civilian purposes towards the defence budget.
•. Reduction in the tax burden. Income tax rates were to be reduced by 30 % over a period of three years and substantial depreciation concessions would be introduced for firms. In this way, Federal revenue as a proportion of GNP was to betrimmed from 21.4 to 19.3 % by 1984, whereas it would have risen to 23 % if policies had remained unchanged.
[] Reduction in government regulation. This related not only to curbing government influence on pricing in sectors such as finance, transport and energy, but also to reducing the costs and bureaucratic procedures that had been spawned by the rapid growth in the number of regulations in the fields of environmental protection, product safety and safety at the workplace.
[] Encouragement of a steady monetary policy oriented towards price stability. In fact, ever since 1979 such a policy had been the objective of the Federal Reserve Board, which in principle is independent of the Administration. However, by lending it the President's * University of Basle.
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The thrust of this programme was quite plain: government influence and interference in private economic activity were to be curbed. The Administration not only saw this as an objective of its laissez faire ideology itself but also expected it to produce concrete results in combating the economic difficulties that had increasingly beset the country since the mid seventies and especially in 1980-81. Foremost among these were three unsolved problems:
[] Inflation. The loss of price stability had begun during the sixties, but it accelerated considerably during the seventies. The expansionary monetary policy pursued until the end of 1978 and the second oil price shock in 1979-80 helped push the inflation rate to a record 13.5 % in 1980.
[] Unemployment. During the upswing that followed the recession of 1974-75 the unemployment rate fell from a peak of 8.5 % to 5.8 % in 1979, but at that level it was still distinctly higher than the average of the fifties and sixties. The combination of the second oil price shock and the severely restrictive policy of the Federal Reserve caused the unemployment rate to rise again, so that it stood at 7.5 % when Reagan came to office.
[] Stagnating labour productivity. As in all other industrialised countries, productivity growth in the USA slowed down markedly in the seventies, from an annual rate of 2.8 % between 1950 and 1973 to one of 0.8 % between 1973 and 1979. As a result of the recession, labour productivity did not increase at all between 1978 USA and Reagan's inauguration and atthe beginning of 1981 real wages were even below the 1973 level. A satisfactory explanation for this stagnation has yet to be found, but it is beyond dispute that the slowdown in capital formation, the faster growth in the labour force and its changed composition were all significant factors.
The Reagan Administration promised remarkable success on all these fronts. Its projections of February 1981, which are reproduced in Table 1 , held out the prospect that real GNP would recover from the recession within three years and would grow at a sustainable long-term rate of more than 4 % thereafter.
Over the same period the inflation rate would gradually fall back to half its previous level; finally, a balanced Federal budget was promised for the 1984 fiscal year.
As we now know, and as Table 1 also shows, actual events diverged markedly from these projections. A new recession began in the third quarter of 1981 ; by the end of 1982 it had developed into the worst decline in economic activity since the second world war. Instead of the projected steady decline in underemployment, the unemployment rate rose temporarily to more than 10 %. Inflation consequently slowed down much more quickly than had been expected, so that by 1983 it stood at its lowest level since 1967.
The steep recession was followed by an equally strong recovery, with the result that today, a year and a half after passing the cyclical trough, not only the inflation rate but also unemployment and GNP growth are relatively close to the projections for 1984. In spite of this success, however, it should not be overlooked that even after two years of very strong growth real GNP in 1984 is still almost 5 % lower than originally forecast by the Administration. Government finances are way off target: instead of the hoped-for balance between receipts and expenditure, there is now a yawning $200 billion budget deficit, and only a small part of this can be attributed to cyclical factors. In addition, real interest rates have risen far higher than expected to reach a record level of about 6 % in 1984.
Against this background, one must ask what the Reagan Administration actually based its projections on and why things turned out so different in practice.
Shortcomings in Economic Policy Formulation
The doctrine underlying the Reagan programme set out from the premise that the traditional tools of demand management had proved ineffectual and that economic policy should instead devote its efforts towards expanding the scope for supply. The catchword was supply-side economics; essentially, this meant growth policy.
The central tenet of the supply-side school was that the tax-levying state had weakened the incentives for 
